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THE DECISION FOR ACCIDENTS: AN APPROACH
TO NONFAULT ALLOCATION OF COSTS
Guido Calabresi *
Although it may seem desirable to seek to eliminate accident-causing
activities, virtually all societies decide that many activities, though
certain to cause some accidents, are nonetheless valuable enough to
be allowed. Professor Calabresi examines this "decision for acci-
dents" in light of the goals of accident law such as deterrence and
compensation. Although he does not propose a specific liability plan
or scheme, he formulates a theoretical framework for nonfault liabil-
ity in which risky activities reflect in their market prices the cost of
their accidents, and in which specific "useless" conduct is deterred
by criminal and semicriminal penalties. He next analyzes what is
meant by "costs of accidents" and concludes with an examination of
the methods of allocating accident costs to the activities involved in
accidents.
I. INTRODUCTION
I TAKE it as given that the principal functions of "accident
law" are to compensate victims and reduce accident costs.
Such incidental benefits as providing respectable livelihoods for a
large number of lawyers and insurance agents are at best benefi-
cent side effects. The notion that accident law's role is punishment
of wrongdoers cannot be taken seriously. Whatever function we
* Professor of Law, Yale University. B.S., Yale, x953; B.A., Oxford, 955;
LL.B., Yale, 1958; MA., Oxford, 1959.
Much of this article was in draft before Professors Blum and Kalven of the
University of Chicago delivered their extremely provocative Shulman lectures at
Yale; all of it was written before those lectures were available in Blum & Kalven,
Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem -Auto Compensation Plans,
31 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 641 (1964). Accordingly, while I shall from time to time refer
to their work, I have made no attempt in this piece to meet directly all of their
telling arguments.
In view of the exhaustive bibliography on the general theme of this article
available in GREGORY & KAILvEN, CASES oN ToRTS at xlix-ii, 689-786 (1959), and
updated by Blum & Kalven, supra at 642 n.2, I have excluded purely bibliographic
footnotes. By the time this article appears another important work on this theme
will be available. Keeton & O'Connell, Basic Protection -A Proposal for Improv-
ing Automobile Claims Systems, 78 HARv. L. REV. 329 (1964).
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may wish to ascribe to punishment in criminal law, it simply will
not carry over to civil accident suits. If the time-honored, though
somewhat shopworn, distinctions between legal and moral fault
and between damages and degree of culpability which prevail in
tort law do not sufficiently demonstrate this proposition, then
surely the prevalence of insurance priced on the basis of cate-
gories that have little to do with any individual insured's "good-
ness" or "badness" must.
Reduction of accident costs might arguably be viewed as cov-
ering even compensation of victims. For "compensation" as an
aim means* only that it is deemed more desirable for persons
other than the injured to pay the costs of the injury. This is be-
cause if many pay the cost of an accident rather than one, or
even if one pays it over time, the social dislocation costs of the
accident may be reduced; I this is the basis of the theory of loss
spreading. And even if loss spreading means no spreading - if it
means only that the man with the deeper pocket pays - the
same cost-reduction effect may be said to exist. For when those
who are "more able to pay" pay, we believe that fewer secondary
undesirable effects will occur.2
Whether it is true that fewer such undesirable effects will ac-
tually occur is not certain. Still, it should not be too surprising
that theories supporting paying for public perils like accidents by
taxing the rich to some degree should find favor; our whole
structure of paying for other public perils, like defense, is based
on the assumption that fewer secondary social harms - costs -
will result if the wealthy pay the greater proportion of the price.
But reduction of accident costs is more commonly taken to
mean reducing the number of accidents or the costs of admin-
istering laws that deal with them.3 To equate these aims with
the savings that "compensation spreading" may achieve would
1 Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 7o
YALE L.J. 499, 517-19 (196i). The use of terms like "cost," "cheaper," "afford,"
and "socially more expensive" in the current article is extremely sloppy from any
economist's viewpoint; I have used the terms in this unrigorous way in an attempt
to make the article intelligible to noneconomists. This effort may be misguided but
I think it is essential. It would not be too difficult to translate these terms into
their relatively precise economic meanings. I have not, however, done this con-
sistently in footnotes because it would make the piece even less readable than it is.
Some appropriate definitions may be found in my article, supra at 503-04 nn.x5 & 18.
21d. at 527-28.
3 The cost of administering accident law is in a sense the control that tells us
if any system of reducing overall costs is worth it, or whether we would not be
better off with a less effective, but cheaper, system.
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be confusing. For this reason, compensation and reduction of
accident costs will be treated separately.
Many recent writers have tended to focus on compensation as
the main purpose of accident law. Were this emphasis proper,
there would be no justification for limiting compensation to acci-
dents and not spreading it across the board to illness, old age,
and all the troubles of this planet. Of course, we do spread com-
pensation beyond accidents to some extent, but it is the fact that
we only do it "to some extent" that is crucial. Why is compensa-
tion for illness - even in highly welfaristic countries - much
less complete than compensation for accidents? And why is the
accident field kept a separate entity, where methods that achieve
a fair degree of compensation spreading are used, but which
would be woefully inefficient if compensation spreading were the
only aim? Surely, if the type of cost reduction with which we are
concerned is solely or principally that accomplished by diminish-
ing secondary costs - social and economic dislocations - then a
generalized system of social insurance covering all types of severe
injuries would be the only efficient system.
4
The answer is that accidents are not the same as diseases.
There are ways to reduce the primary cost of accidents - their
number and severity -that can, indeed must, be an important
aim of whatever system of law that governs the field. One way is
to discourage those activities that result in accidents and to substi-
tute safer ones for them. Another is to encourage care in the
course of an activity.5 "Activity" and "care" are not, of course,
mutually exclusive categories. If "activity" is defined narrowly
or if "care" is broadly viewed, the concepts tend to merge. The
activity of driving is not thought to be careless although a pre-
dictable number of accidents result from it. Driving through a
busy intersection without brakes is careless and not an activity.
Between these relatively clear cases the distinction becomes more
difficult, as, for example, navigating without radar. In addition,
an activity may properly be defined as the doing of something by
4 There might, of course, be perfectly respectable political objections to such a
social insurance system, despite agreement that compensation is the overriding
goal and despite the fact that social insurance is the cheapest way of accomplishing
it.
' But discouraging dangerous activities and encouraging care in the course of an
activity are not the only aims of the system; as we have seen before, compensation
is an equally important aim. As a result we may well not want to go as far as
we otherwise would in trying to reduce the primary cost of accidents if this would
be accomplished at the expense of compensation.
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an actuarial class, which may tend to do it carelessly. Treating
the problems of accident law in terms of activities rather than in
terms of careless conduct is the first step toward a rational
system of resource allocation. The question is to what extent an
economically rational system is our goal.
II. THE NATURE OF THE DECISION FOR ACCIDENTS
Our society is not committed to preserving life at any cost. In
its broadest sense, this rather unpleasant notion should be ob-
vious. Wars are fought. The University of Mississippi is inte-
grated. But what is more interesting to the study of accident law,
though perhaps equally obvious, is that lives are used up when
the quid pro quo is not some great moral principle but "conven-
ience." Ventures are undertaken that, statistically at least, are
certain to cost lives. Thus, we build a tunnel under Mont Blanc
because it is essential to the Common Market and cuts down the
traveling time from Rome to Paris, though we know that about
a man per kilometer of tunnel will die. We take planes and cars
rather than safer, slower means of travel. And perhaps most
telling, we use relatively safe equipment rather than the safest
imaginable because - and it is not a bad reason - the safest
costs too much.6
Of course, it is rarely known who is to die. Indeed, in the
uncustomary case of an individual- a known individual rather
than a statistical unknown- in a position of life or death, we
are apt to spend very much more to save him than in any con-
ceivable money sense he is worth. And while I do not doubt this
is as it should be, it seems odd that we should refuse to apply the
same standards of "value beyond any price" when we deal with
the same man's life as part of a statistic. But odd or not, it is the
case.
A decision balancing lives against money or convenience when
made in the broadest terms is not purely an economic one. The
decision whether the Mont Blanc tunnel is worth building is not
based solely on whether the revenue received from tolls through
the completed tunnel will pay for the construction costs, includ-
ing compensation-of the killed-and maimed. Neither is the deci-
6 It should be apparent that while some of these accident-causing activities also
result in diminution of accidents (the Mont Blanc tunnel may well save more lives
by diminishing traffic fatalitiks than it took to build it), this explanation does not
come close to justifying most accident-causing activities. Thus, grade crossings are
allowed because they are cheap, not because they save more lives than they take.
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sion whether to allow prostitution based solely on whether it can
pay its way. Such a pure free enterprise solution has never been
acceptable. It was in fact rejected by even the most classical of
classical economists, though they felt it necessary to explain the
rejection in terms of a theory that is as narrow or broad as any
society, welfaristic or free enterprise, cares to make it.' The
real issue, whether or not expressed in terms of these economists'
"hidden social costs" or "hidden social savings" theory, is how
often a decision for or against an activity is to be allowed regard-
less of whether it can pay its way. Such decisions operate, on the
one hand, to create subsidies for some activities that could not
survive in the market place, and on the other, to bar some activ-
ities that can more than pay their way. The frequency with which
decisions to ignore the market are made tells something about the
nature of a society-welfare or laissez-faire. What is clear is
that in virtually all societies such decisions to overrule the market
are made, but are made only sometimes.
Characteristically, in the field of accident law the decision
whether or not to take lives in exchange for money or conven-
ience is sometimes made politically or collectively without a bal-
ancing of the money value of the lives taken against the money
price of the convenience, and sometimes made through the market
on the basis of such a value. The reasons for this varying ap-
proach are not entirely reasons of principle. Great moral issues
lend themselves to political determination. These questions must
necessarily be decided in whatever political way our society
chooses to decide moral questions. But "rotary mowers versus
reel mowers," "one method of making steel as against another"
are questions difficult of collective decision. For one thing, they
occur too frequently. Every choice of product and use hides
within it a decision regarding safety and expense. The dramatic
cases we resolve politically. We ban the general sale of fireworks
regardless of the ability or willingness of the manufacturer to
pay for all of the injuries that result. But we cannot deal with
all issues involved in all activities through the political process.
For most, the marketplace serves as the rough testing ground. A
manufacturer is free to employ a process even if it occasionally
kills or maims if he is able to show that consumers want his
product badly enough to enable him to compensate those he in-
jures and still make a profit. Economists would say that except
7 See, e.g., PiGou, Tm EcoNolacs oF WELFARz (4th ed. 1932).
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in those few areas of collective decision, this is the best way to
decide if the activity is worth having.
All this is just saying, in a slightly different way, that one of
the functions of accident law is to reduce the cost of accidents,
by reducing those activities that are accident prone. Activities
are made more expensive, and thereby less attractive, to the ex-
tent of the accidents they cause. In the extreme cases they are
priced out of the market: the market mechanism may thus elim-
inate an otherwise useful activity because it maims too many.
Since the smallest practical subdivision of an activity has been
defined as larger than any particular mode of conduct that might
be characterized as faulty, it might at this point be contended
that it is throwing out the baby with the bath to aim at deterrence
of activities rather than simply trying to eliminate conduct that
is responsible for accidents. Why not forbid talking while driving
through busy intersections rather than seek to deter driving gen-
erally? Why discourage perfectly useful activities when there is
available an accident law based on fault, which ferrets out partic-
ular undesirable conduct?
Such questions assume two things: that we can define the un-
desirable conduct that is responsible for accidents apart from the
cost of accidents it causes, and that we deter it through the cur-
rent system of accident law based on fault. The first of these
propositions is not totally unreasonable. There are acts or activ-
ities that we would bar in our society regardless of the willingness
of the doer to pay for the harm they cause. It is these that we
call "useless" 8 and feel that there is no societal loss in deterring
them specifically. But certainly even if some such activities can
be isolated, there are a great many other activities whose unde-
sirability consists only in the fact that they result in accidents
and then only to the extent that people would, if they knew the
costs of these accidents, prefer to abstain from the activity rather
than pay those costs. I think the discussion of "decisions for
accidents" has shown that much.
Those acts or activities that we call "useless" fall into two
categories. The first comprises those in which the doer has suffi-
' This is, of course, an interesting use of words. Driving without having an
inspection, like drunken driving, prostitution, and widgets, undoubtedly has its
adherents. They are - let us assume - willing to pay for the accidents they cause,
yet as a society we say they may not so choose and bar the activity anyway.
We call the activity valueless and say there is no societal loss in proscribing it,
not because it has no value, but because we do not accept individual judgments
as to its value.
[Vol. 78:713
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cient control over the deed so that criminal penalties are appro-
priate. If these penalties are properly set, they must inevitably
do a better job of deterrence than the fault system. The second
comprises those in which the doer has such insufficient control
that criminal penalties are, under our system, deemed inappro-
priate. How many acts or activities actually fall in this category
is doubtful, but it is certainly as to these that the traditional fault
system may be relevant. The question then is, Can we not deter
these acts or activities more effectively than through a system of
fault liability which, together with insurance, merely raises some-
what the cost to those who as an actuarial class tend to do these
acts or activities? I suggest, and it is not a particularly original
suggestion, that a system of noninsurable tort fines assessed on
the individual doer of the "useless" act, together with general
nonfault liability, would do a far better job of deterring valueless
activities of this type.
This leaves those acts or activities that, as a society, we are
unprepared to call valueless - those activities that, subject to
some subsequent political reconsideration and modification, we
want to permit to the extent that they can pay for their accident
costs. I would suggest, though it is not crucial to my analysis,
that these comprise the bulk of the decisions as to accidents.
Despite Learned Hand's formulation that negligence is a balanc-
ing of the "danger of an activity" against what must usefully be
given up to avoid that danger,' it is altogether too clear that a
system of fault liability is designed to deal only with "useless"
conduct ana not with the more subtle interests involved in meas-
uring the value and danger of an activity. If using a threshold of
terrazzo is not deemed careless, then a system based on fault - as
an all-or-nothing proposition -will have no effect whatever on
this activity.'0 The best way we can establish the extent to which
we want to allow such activities is by a market decision based on
the relative price of each of these activities and of their substi-
tutes when each bears the costs of the accidents it causes. This
can be done by a system of nonfault enterprise liability, a system
that assesses the costs of accidents to activities according to their
involvement in accidents. By contrast, our fault system, with
insurance, assesses the cost of an activity not according to the
number of accidents it causes but according to the number of
I Conway v. O'Brien, iii F.2d 6i, 612 (2d Cir. 1940), rev'd on other grounds,
312 U.S. 492 (1941).
'°See Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co., X20 Utah 31, 232 P.2d 210 (1951).
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accidents it causes in which certain predetermined indicia of fault
can be attributed to it. This results in a deterrence of only faultily
caused accidents in an area where by hypothesis we are interested
in deterring activities not because of some moral implications but
because of the accidents they cause.
It follows from the above that the job of accident deterrence
can be done more efficiently through criminal and semicriminal
penalties aimed at useless conduct, plus nonfault enterprise liabil-
ity,1 than under a fault liability system. Two all-important cau-
tions remain, however. The first is that we must know how to
allocate the cost of accidents among competing accident-causing
activities. Unless we have some way of deciding whom to burden
with what part of the cost, the market will not help much in
deterring the accident-causing activity. The second problem is
no less puzzling. Even if we know what activity causes what
accidents, it is not enough to say we will discourage that activity
by making it bear the cost of that accident. For we must decide
what the cost of an accident is. And this is not as simple as it
seems. Is it the economic loss, is it pain and suffering, or is it the
price needed to buy a willing victim? If the market is to tell us
whether we want an activity despite its accident costs, we have
21 Such a nonfault enterprise liability does not at all preclude us from making
collective judgments against the market- either to bar activities that seemingly
can pay their way or to subsidize some that seemingly cannot. For example, let us
assume that under a fault standard we discourage 18-25 year. olds from driving
because they cause proportionately more accidents than other groups of drivers
when they are doing something we currently term "faulty." Let us further assume
that people over 6o are involved in proportionately as many accidents -but that
currently they do not pay as much insurance because their accidents are not
"caused by their fault." A nonfault system would put the two groups in similar
insurance categories. To start with, fewer people above 6o could afford to drive.
If accidents were our concern- rather than metaphysical or moral fault notions-
this would be a good result. But at this point we might feel - collectively - that
driving at least at certain ages is too important and that individual members of our
society ought to be allowed to drive whether they can afford it or not, or -which
is really the same -that driving by these people is so important for our society
as a whole that we cannot let the market bar them from driving despite their
accident proneness. If this were so, we would as a group, politically, make a
decision for accidents - reversing the market pressure against them - by subsidiz-
ing the groups we wished to have drive despite their accident records. But in
doing this we would also have to face the question of how many classes of people
we wished to subsidize. We might conclude that though drivers 21-25 and 60-70
should be subsidized, driving by 18-21 year olds and those over 7o is not worth
subsidizing. The importance of having them drive would not justify overruling
the market discouragement to their driving that had resulted from their accident
proneness.
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to put in approximately the right costs. It is these two crucial
questions that I want to consider next, in reverse order.
III. WHAT COSTS SHOULD BE INCLUDED
Assuming the activity. responsible for an accident is in every
case knowable, the first problem is to determine the cost of the
accident. The task is simplified when the only costs are economic
ones - that is, costs such as property damage that are calculable
in terms of market values. Although problems in determining
exact cost persist, there is at least no argument as to the subject
of the computation. Indeed, if economic damages were the only
costs of accidents there would be no objection to complete market
rule. If building a tunnel under Mont Blanc would cost X mil-
lion lire in property damages - and only in property damages -
the enterprise would be deemed desirable if it remained attractive
to investors who took these costs into account.
An exception to letting the market prevail would arise in areas
where a component of the damage involves some noneconomic
values. Thus, before a "nuisance" that can pay its damages is
allowed to continue, a political or judicial decision that it is
worthwhile must be reached. A market test of whether the activ-
ity can pay for the property it destroys does not demonstrate that
it could pay for the noneconomic value it destroys.'2
There are three ways of determining whether an activity ought
to be allowed to destroy noneconomic values: political or judicial
judgment (the government should have eminent domain powers;
the Mont Blanc tunnel is desirable but must pay its economic
damage costs); market judgment based on a rough conversion of
noneconomic values into dollar amounts (let the jury decide the
cost of pain and suffering, as well as of work hours lost; if the
tunnel can pay for it, let the tunnel be); or a combination of the
two. Thus, there may in some cases be a political decision that
if an activity meets the market costs of some or all of its non-
economic damage costs (as estimated by a jury) it is sufficiently
worthwhile to be allowed. In other cases the judgment might be
that although an activity meets all of these tioneconomic costs as
, 2 Presumably this is because we recognize that property ownership has some
important noneconomic values which we want to protect. This does not mean,
however, that we wish to make a taker who has an equivalent social utility (a
"worthwhile" nuisance or the government in an eminent domain proceeding) pay
for this noneconomic value.
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best estimated, it still ought to be barred simply because it barely
meets these and the activity is not considered good enough in the
face of our distrust of a jury's estimate of these noneconomic
values.
In fact, of course, we use all three methods in varying degrees
and in varying areas. It is worthwhile to consider a little more
closely the nature of these mixed determinations of what is prop-
erly the "cost" of an accident. Admittedly, confusion in making
such determinations is engendered by a perhaps irrelevant, but
humanly overwhelming, factor -compensation. I say that this
is perhaps irrelevant for there is no reason - a priori - why
whether a man gets compensation for pain and suffering should
be tied to whether the activity that caused the accident should be
made to pay the costs. Pain and suffering damages could be col-
lected and not given to victims, or might not be collected from
accident causers and yet paid out to victims from a social insur-
ance fund. The question whether, in terms of achieving the
proper "allocation of resources" (the proper degree of deterrence
of accident-causing activities), it is socially desirable to make the
activity pay for the pain and suffering it causes is logically sep-
arate from the question whether some money equivalent of pain
and suffering is to be shifted or left as chance makes it fall.-3
Assuming that the problems of compensation and allocation of
burdens can be separated, the problem of what cost an activity
should bear must be approached in terms of the function of cost
allocation in deterring accident-causing activities.' The function
is not to abolish all accident-causing activities. Rather it is to
cause the price of products or activities more nearly to reflect
their costs. In other words the accident costs of making widgets
out of aluminum are to be put on aluminum widgets, and the
accident costs of making widgets out of steel are to be put on steel
widgets, so that the nation of buyers can decide, on the basis of a
full picture of what it costs to have each, how many of each are
desired.
I have elsewhere described the ethical and economic postulates
that underlie the notion that the best product mix is achieved
when production decisions are made on the basis of consumer
choices grounded on prices that reflect the costs - including the
13 This is so unless, of course, leaving the burden of pain and suffering or other
similar types of damages on the victim is expected to affect the victim's behavior
and his activities in a "resource allocation sense."
[Vol. 78:71 3
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accident costs- of competing products."4 I have also pointed
out that by and large we are still committed to these ethical and
economic postulates. I shall not repeat that discussion here. It is
enough for this article to assume arguendo that the best product
and activity mix will be achieved if prices of goods and activities
reflect what we feel are the true costs they impose on society.
This assumption underlies a determination of (a) what the
costs of an accident are, and (b) whether an activity will be al-
lowed (i) if it meets its economic costs, (2) if it meets both
economic and noneconomic costs, or (3) only if it can "buy a
willing victim." It describes a system in which the costs that
people feel to be relevant to the decision between aluminum and
steel widgets must be included in the costs of manufacturing
each.
For example, suppose that my Electromobile is destroyed
in an accident. Although its market value was only one hundred
dollars, I had a great sentimental attachment to it because my
Aunt Euphoria gave it to me. Ought the price of driving to reflect
the destruction of this sentimental value? Do we feel in choosing
between driving and riding trains that the fact that driving -let
us assume - destroys more of such sentimental values than
trains is something about which we wish to know? Is it some-
thing we wish so strongly to know about to go through the ex-
pense of estimating it in a thousand and one accidents in order
to have it become a part of the relative price difference between
driving and riding?
Silly as this example may be, it has the virtue of demonstrating
that certain types of noneconomic damages are not normally
treated as costs. Others, like pain and suffering, are taken into
account when assessing the cost of an accident. The line between
them is drawn by some form of collective judgment. When the
expense of estimating the cost to society of some species of non-
economic damage is thought reasonable, then that cost is com-
puted and entered into the relative price of activities.
The process of computation that has been adopted indicates a
certain lack of faith in the accuracy of a translation of noneco-
nomic values into dollar amounts. First, a political or judicial
decision is made as to what kinds of costs are not worth bothering
with. Then, a jury, often thought to be the institution most likely
to reflect collective judgment, evaluates in each case what the
14 Calabresi, supra note x.
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nonmoney costs are worth. Thus, we allow an ad hoc reexamina-
tion of the political decision.15 The limitations that necessarily
inhere in this rather haphazard way of deciding what are real
costs and their amount, as well as the fact that the choice must
be influenced by the expense of evaluating these nonmoney costs,
go far toward explaining why the market is only allowed to op-
erate to a limited extent in deciding for or against accidents.
The nonmoney value of my home destroyed when International
Phtui Works - an alleged nuisance - renders it unlivable may
be real enough. But this should not be considered when the cost
of evaluation is so great that the relative price of Phtuinuts would
be biased more by including it than by leaving it out.Y0 The only
alternative is to try to decide at the beginning, collectively,
whether Phtuinuts could pay for this value ignoring the cost of
evaluation. In a real sense this is what we do when we decide
that the Phtui Works, though a nuisance, will not be enjoined
but only be made to pay economic damages. This may also be
what we decide when we prohibit some accident-causing activ-
ities though they can pay their economic costs, and even perhaps
the estimated dollar value of pain and suffering.
Needless to say, ifiany decisions are in the other direction.
Driving is allowed if drivers can pay economic loss plus a large
measure of noneconomic loss. Although the activity does not even
then bear the full measure of its cost, the additional computation
is simply too expensive to undertake. It is assumed -decided
collectively - that to the extent that these nonincluded losses are
greater than in competing activities, driving is of sufficiently
greater uncomputed noneconomic value to cover them.17
" In practice, moreover, both the original political decision and the jury's
ad hoc reexamination are made with the knowledge that compensation depends on
the judgment. This probably tends to emphasize the question whether a real cost
is involved. That is, it tends to dramatize the consequences of refusing to award
a noneconomic cost, and therefore to make us think twice before we decide that
a cost is not worth computing and entering into the relative price of activities.
1 6 Technically, there would be a greater misallocation of resources if the cost
were computed and included than if it were left out.
" This is just making the best of a bad situation. Failing to include these losses
means that people will drive more than they should; failing to include uncomput-
able noneconomic benefits means they will drive less than they should. There is
no assurance that the two will even out or, more important, that they will stand
in the same relation to each other with respect to driving and with respect to other
activities that compete with driving. But since computing them would, ex
hypothesi, result in a greater bias than not computing them, this is the best we
can do. We can then comfort ourselves in the knowledge that resource allocation
IVol. 78:713
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IV. WHAT IS A COST OF WHAT ACTIVITY
The difficulty of deciding which costs are relevant is painfully
apparent. When compounded with the problem of deciding what
costs are allocable to which activity, the game of deterring com-
peting accident-causing activities by making their prices reflect
their full cost and letting the market decide may well seem not
worth the candle. Why is it sometimes thought that a heart attack
is caused by an automobile accident and sometimes by the vic-
tim's occupation? Is a pedestrian-auto accident to be attributed
to driving or walking? Despite their familiar ring, these questions
are not meant to herald a metaphysical search for ultimate causes.
Rather they must be approached in terms of a "social cost ac-
counting" system, 8 in which activities are made to bear their
costs in pursuit of sounder resource allocation.
The methodology involved in finding the accident costs of an
activity is deceptively simple. The cost of any activity, A, in-
cludes the sum of the cost of accidents in which A alone is
involved and some part of the cost of all other accidents in which
A is involved with other activities. Solving the problem is more
complex. A solution requires that criteria be evolved for appor-
tioning the cost of an accident among those activities that caused
it. There is no formula for allocating the cost of an accident
among the activities involved, as there is no such formula for
allocating overhead costs among activities that share the same
facilities. One is reduced to making guesses in light of the goals
of the system, as do cost accountants and regulatory agencies.
When the system extends to the whole of society, the goals be-
come harder to define and the guess more open to error. A cost
accountant for an oil-drilling company need not study the effect
on the rest of the economy of buying extra equipment needed to
recover gas as well as oil. A student of accident law cannot a
priori neglect the effects of discouraging driving on, for example,
walking, busing, and cycling.
A. Bargaining Situations
There are, happily, some situations in which it will not matter
which of two activities initially bears the cost of an accident since
even in theory is an exercise in doing the best possible and not in achieving
perfection.
18 This phrase for describing what I have been calling "resource allocation" or
"general deterrence" was suggested by Professor Alfred Conard of the Michigan
Law School.
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ultimately the cost will affect the behavior of both. In theory,
these are all the situations in which the two or more possible
accident-causing activities are related by bargaining."
Thus, in theory, and to use an example from most basic torts
books, it ultimately makes no difference whether the dock owner
or the shipowner in Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co.2 0 is held
liable for damage to the dock caused by an unexpected storm. If
the shipowner is liable, dockage fees will be less; if the dock
owner is liable, dockage fees will be more. In either case the
extent to which each activity ultimately bears the loss depends
on its bargaining power with the other - essentially on how
easily the other can find a cheaper, because less accident-prone,
substitute. If the loss is put on ships, the ships will tend to min-
imize their losses by going to safer docks, until unsafe dock
owners have cut their prices sufficiently to make using them and
bearing accident costs as cheap as using safer docks. If the dock
owners bear the loss they will minimize it by installing safety
devices until it becomes cheaper to pay for the accidents rather
than installing more safety devices. The same will apply in re-
verse if the cheapest way to avoid the loss is to make safer ships.
In any event, the least expensive way to minimize the loss will be
sought out and used whichever of the two is initially liable.
This kind of argument can be made with varying degrees of
realism in any bargaining situation. Should the cost of industrial
accidents be put on workers or on their employers? Should the
cost of rotary as against reel lawn mowers be borne by the manu-
facturers or the users? Theoreticians will insist that in terms of
"general" deterrence of accident-prone activities it makes no dif-
ference either way.2 In fact, of course, it can make a great deal
of difference, but for reasons that do not require us to answer the
broader question of "what costs belong to what activities."
The first reason for the difference is that-one of the two actors
may, in practice, be far better able than the other to evaluate
the accident risk, that is, the expected accident costs. And if this
is the case, his activity is the more suitable one, in terms of deter-
rence of accident-prone activities, to bear the initial loss. If
individual purchasers are made to bear the cost of rotary mower
19 See Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem -
Auto Compensation Plans, 3 z U. Cm. L. Ray. 641, 695-97 (1964).
20 i9 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 223 (19-o).
21 CI. Blum & Kalven, s,,pra note ig, at 696-97.
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accidents and invariably underestimate their likelihood, they
will not purchase a substitute mower that seems more expensive.
Presumably, the rotary mower industry, on the other hand, knows
pretty clearly the expected cost of using mowers in any given
year; and by putting the cost directly on the industry, individuals
are made aware of these costs and are better able to make the
appropriate choice for or against accidents. To the extent that
they choose against accidents (against the higher-priced mowers,
reflecting the accidents), pressure will then exist on the mower
companies to develop safety devices.
The second reason is that it may not cost the two parties the
same amount to insure against the loss. If the loss is placed on
the party for whom insurance is less available or more expensive,
a false cost - the excess cost of his insuring - will be made a
part of the price of the goods. Self-insurance does not modify
this; it only suggests that occasionally one of the parties is suffi-
ciently large so that noninsurance is the cheapest alternative.
Once again the choice of loss bearers depends on which of the
two parties to the bargain can inject the cost into the price of the
goods or service most cheaply.
The third reason is somewhat more complex. If placing the
loss on one of the two parties to the bargain results in all or part
of the loss being removed from both of the parties and placed on
totally unrelated parties, then such placing of loss is undesirable.
For example, if placing the cost of a rotary mower accident on
the user resulted, for political or social reasons based on a desire
to compensate, in the loss being paid for by the government out
of general social insurance, such loss allocation would tend to
frustrate the proper choice for or against rotary mowers. If
placing the loss on the mower company instead did not result in
such an externalization, there would be a clear reason for placing
the loss on the mower company.
The classic example of all this is, of course, industrial acci-
dents. It did make a difference in terms of accident deterrence
(despite the theoreticians of the time) whether industrial acci-
dents were charged first to workers or to industry. This was not
because "metaphysically" industry always was more the cause
of the accidents than workers, but because industry could insure
more cheaply than the workers and was better informed on what
the costs of accidents would be, and because placing the loss on
the workers would most likely have resulted in externalizing part
of it from both workers and industry. Placing the loss on industry
1965]
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therefore better enabled us to minimize accident losses by an ap-
propriate choice for or against accidents. 2
The theoretician will object that the placing of such costs aris-
ing from a bargaining situation on anyone but the ultimately in-
jured party is in fact compelling the ultimately injured party to
insure himself against that accident. He will argue that the user
of rotary mowers might find it cheaper not to have the company
that manufactures such mowers pay for any accident costs to
him, because he is a careful user and therefore the accident risk
to him would be less than the average accident costs reflected in
the price. Or he might assert that he is a user to whom a toe
means less than to most, and that therefore, when the price of
mowers to him reflects the average cost of the average toe, he is
overpaying.
23
To some extent this is of course true. The choice to self-insure,
or to insure in other ways, is removed from the ultimately injured
party when in a bargaining situation the original cost is put on
the other party. But the reverse is equally true, because there is
nothing "ultimate" about who is the ultimately injured party.
Thus, if the initial cost of mower accidents is put on the users,
the manufacturers of mowers are as forced to insure with the
users as the users would be forced to insure with the manufac-
turers if the cost were put on the manufacturers. And the
same problems of overcharging the more "careful" manufacturer
through such compulsory insurance exist as did in the reverse
situations. In fact, if there is a significant difference in the acci-
dent potential of one user from another, the cost of the product
to him will reflect that difference, even if the original cost is not
put on him.
24
22 It is interesting to speculate on the effect that unionization may have had on
this "classic" example. It may well be that with the existence of highly organized
unions, there would now be no difference in many industrial contexts if the worker
initially bore the cost of industrial accidents instead of the employer. There might
even be some situations, involving many small employers and one strong union,
in which the best initial loss bearer would be the 'employee.
2' Compare Blum & Kalven, supra note xg, at 697-98.
4 In theory - the same theory, indeed, that suggests that it makes no difference
which of two bargaining parties initially bears -the loss - this would always happen.
And this is one reason why it does not matter in theory who initially bears the loss.
In practice, of course, this will only happen in cases where there is a very
important difference in the actual accident potential of users (assuming sellers are
made to bear the initial loss). If it is cheaper for users to evaluate the different
accident potential of sellers Lhan for sellers to evaluate the user's accident potential,
this might be a reason for placing the cost initially on the user rather than the
seller. But it is a reason ol the same order and type as those previously discussed
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The best we can do, then, in a bargaining situation is to place
the original cost on the party to the bargain whose actuarial class
can best evaluate the risk of such costs in the future.2 5 There will
be many situations in which it will not matter because both sides
of the bargain are equally informed. There will be others in
which it is very hard to say which side is better informed and
other considerations such as specific deterrence, or compensation,
will rule because general deterrence gives no guide or does
not make sufficient difference. But there are many situations in
which it seems that a difference does exist, and here we can expect
liability to be placed on the better informed party. Workmen's
compensation and, to a lesser extent, the dichotomy between re-
spondeat superior and the independent contractor rule are ex-
amples of this choice.
Recently, it has been ably argued that the same reasoning may
apply in a great variety of situations in which a bargaining or
contractual relationship does not exist between the potential orig-
inal bearers of the accident cost.2 6 The argument runs that if
the cost of a factory-smoke nuisance, for instance, is put on the
homeowner rather than on the factory, and the cheapest way to
avoid this cost is not for the homeowner to move or wear a gas-
mask but is for the factory to install a smoke-clearing device or
cut down production, the homeowner will pay the factory to do
this. On the other hand, if the cost is originally put on the factory,
and the best way to minimize the loss is to get the homeowners
to move, the factory will find it cheaper to pay for such a move
rather than to cut down production. Either way, it is argued, the
market will find the cheapest way to deter or minimize the loss.
And while there may be some difference in the end as to who is
richer and who is poorer, in terms of general cost deterrence the
same results will be achieved whoever bears the initial 1oss.27
reasons that determine which of two parties to a bargain we want to bear the
loss initially. As such it must be considered together with -them.
What cannot be done is what Blum and Kalven appear to do -ignore the other
reasons because "in theory" they do not matter, and nevertheless place great weight
on this single reason for choosing a loss bearer. See Blum & Kalven, supra note
ig, at 696-98.25 This is in the broad sense defined above. See pp. 726-28 supra.
20 Coase, The Problem of Socidal Cost, 3 J.. & Ecoxomcs x (x96o).
2 A difference in who is richer or poorer may, however, mean an undesirable
compensation effect with concomitant secondary losses. Should this be so and
should such secondary losses result in a desire to remove the cost from either party
and pay it, for example, out of a general social insurance fund then a crucial and
probably undesirable effect in terms of general cost deterrence is likely.
x9651
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The argument is essentially that a bargaining relationship can
always be established between the original loss bearer and the
party best able to minimize the loss. In a perfect world such a
bargaining relationship will always result in the appropriate min-
imization of the loss.
28
The first problem with this view, and one fully recognized by
its author,29 is that it costs money to enter into such a bargaining
relationship. Thus, while it might be cheaper to install a smoke-
clearing device than to have the neighboring homeowners move,
if the damage is originally put on the homeowners it may be more
expensive to get them together to bargain with the company and
then to pay the company to install the smoke clearer than it
would be to move. In such a case placing the loss on the factory
initially would, in fact, minimize losses whereas placing it on the
" It is not clear to me, however, despite the examples in the article by Professor
Coase, supra note 26, at 5-8, that no difterence will exist in the really long run.
Let us assume, as I take it Coase does, perfect competition and also a liability
system in which Coase's cows pay damages. Let us assume further that an
equilibrium is arrived at, through bargaining, in which each cattle raiser keeps three
cows and pays the neighboring farmer $4.oo to avoid the $6.oo crop loss Coase
posits by planting a crop cows do not like and that the $4.oo bribe plus the
market price of the new crop yields the farmer as much as the previous crop did.
In a perfectly competitive world just enough cattle raisers and enough farmers
will engage in each business at this equilibrium so that the marginal farmer and the
marginal cattle raiser will each earn the same return on his investment- the
same return in fact available in any other nonmonopolistic activity. Let us now
alter the liability system: cows no longer pay for crop damage. It is true, as Coase
suggests, that the cattle raiser will still keep his "optimal" three cows and the
farmer will plant the same crop that cows do not like. Nothing has happened to
change that. But now farmers who plant this crop are $4.oo poorer than they were
previously and cattle raisers $4.oo richer. The rate of return on the investment of
even the marginal cattle raisers will now be higher than in other industries, the
rate of return of marginal farmers will be lower. Assuming, as Coase must in his
perfect world, free entry and exit, people will move into cattle raising from neutral
occupations, and people will leave farming to enter these same neutral occupations.
A new equilibrium will be established, and perhaps each cattle raiser will still
keep three cows and each farmer raise the same crops, but there will nevertheless
be more three-cow cattle raisers, and hence more cows, and fewer farmers and
fewer crops.
The short of the matter is, liability rules do affect the amount of money people
make-in the short run; and in the long run people will enter those activities
where they make more money. Thus, although each individual may, through
bargaining, minimize the effect of a liability rule by paying the person he injured to
do his best to avoid the injury, this can only reduce the misallocation effect of
originally putting the loss on -the wrong party. It cannot eliminate it. Mitigation is
good enough for me and the analysis in this article; whether it suits Professor
Coase as well, I do not know. See also note 30 infra.2 9 Coase, supra note 26, at iS.
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homeowners would not. The difference between this situation and
the situation in which the two potential loss bearers are already
bargaining (for example, Vincent v. Lake Erie) is that there is
no added cost of bargaining caused by placing the loss on one
party rather than the other.
The second problem with the view is that apart from costs
there are many situations in which artificial bargaining is even
theoretically impossible because one group of "bargainers" can-
not be organized without some degree of outside coercion. Sup-
pose that the cheapest way to reduce automobile-pedestrian acci-
dents were to have fewer cars on the road. If the cost of accidents
were originally placed on cars, the desired effect to the extent de-
sired would be achieved. If the cost of accidents were placed on
pedestrians, however, quite apart from the cost of finding and pay-
ing some auto users not to drive, the desired effect would never
come about. This is because, absent some coercion, some pedes-
trians would decline to pay their share of the cost of bribing the
drivers to drive less. They would seek a free ride on those pedes-
trians who sought to lessen driving by paying for the diminution.
The situation seems analogous to that in a "perfectly competitive"
market where despite the fact that higher returns could be
achieved by sellers if they could all join to raise their prices, no
such price rise occurs because each individual seller seems to
have an advantage in selling for less.
For both theoretical and practical reasons, therefore, there are
many situations in which we cannot assume that it makes no dif-
ference, in terms of accident deterrence, who is saddled with the
original liability. ° Nor can we assume that in these cases we
3 0 If in addition my doubts about the long-run situation are true, see note 28
supra, than all Coase proves is that no matter how we may misallocate resources
in the first instance, the market will operate through artificial bargains to mitigate
the effect of the misallocation but not to correct it altogether. The same would be
true if we were dealing with costs that could not conceivably be taken to belong to
the party originally burdened, as it would if the costs might seem properly to
belong to that party. Thus, if for no good reason the government chose to put
the cost of smoke pollution on television manufacturers, television manufacturers
would bribe people to wear gas masks, or factories to reduce smoke, or both, to
whatever degree would most cheaply reduce the cost. The resulting allocation
would be better than if television manufacturers could do nothing to reduce the
cost of smoke pollution. It would not, however, be as good an allocation as
would have come about if the cost had been allocated originally to the factory or
to the homeowner. For the result would be, despite the mitigation, that some
marginal television producers would drop out, and fewer TV sets would be made
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need only look to the party who can minimize the cost of acci-
dents most easily and put the cost on him. First, we may not
know who he is. Second, we cannot assume that any single party
is in such a position. For instance, to return to automobiles and
pedestrians, it may well be that the best way to reduce accidents
is to have both less driving and less walking. If this is so, given
the limitations of "artificial bargaining," we cannot simply put
all the cost on one or the other. Third, and perhaps most impor-
tant, the world is infinitely more complex than the example. The
choice is not between fewer pedestrians or fewer cais. It is among
fewer old cars, new cars, cars driven by teenagers and aged
ladies, fewer old pedestrians and crippled pedestrians, and all
of these in relation to fewer buses and trains and better streets,
better street lighting, and so on forever.
In other words, we cannot begin by determining the combina-
tion of activities that, given what we consider to be real costs of
accidents, brings about the degree of reduction of accidents that
we want in the cheapest possible way."1 Nor can we count on the
market to accomplish the same thing through artificial bargains
between parties who originally bear the accident costs and parties
who by their activities can reduce accident costs. The result is
that although there are situations in which the choice of an orig-
inal loss bearer is relatively easy because it either makes no dif-
ference or because the choice depends on an estimate of relative
abilities to value properly the risks involved, there are other
situations in which the choice of the original loss bearer or, if you
wish, the question of what loss belongs to what activity, is not
only important, but hard!
than would optimally be desired. The same would be true if the cheapest way of
avoiding smoke damage was by having factories install a smoke-clearing device,
and the original cost of smoke pollution was put on neighboring homeowners.
Once again the homeowners would bribe the factories to install the device and the
loss would be mitigated- but some marginal homeowners would find the extra
tax too much and would move in with their mothers-in-law. This too would not
be the optimal arrangement.
31 It is ironic that this seems to be the suggestion of as devoted a "free market"
economist as Professor Coase, supra note 26, at z5-28. For (quite apart from the
problem of accidents and like costs) the major reason for having the market usually
decide how much of what we want produced and how, rather than deciding the
matter "administratively" or "collectively," is the very same difficulty of deciding
what combination of goods yields the highest value of production at the lowest
cost. Id. at 40. So it seems strange to assume that in the case of accidents we can
first decide how much of what activities we want and then arrange damage and
cost allocations to bring this combination about.
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B. Categories and Subcategories
This difficulty, though, is not grounds for abandoning an other-
wise valuable approach if partial answers may be discovered and
if the partial resolution is better than none at all. In many situa-
tions in which it is difficult to determine whether an accident is a
cost of one activity or another, it is still sensible not to attribute
it to a third activity. The cost of a pedestrian-auto accident may
not easily be divided between driving and walking, but in terms
of general accident deterrence it is better to allocate it to one or
the other or both rather than to "externalize" it. The reason
should be clear. If the costs of automobile-pedestrian accidents
are externalized and treated as part of the cost of a "social insur-
ance scheme" financed out of general taxes, the only decision that
this might, in theory, affect is whether to live in America or
Argentina; once people have decided to live in America, it will
not affect their decision to drive cars or to walk. They will not
be in a position to make the proper choice for or against acci-
dents, and no "general deterrence pressure" will exist.
This is not to argue that auto-pedestrian accidents are not also
general costs of living in America. They are, of course. But put-
ting the cost on autos or pedestrians will affect not only the deci-
sion to drive or walk, but if the cost is significant enough, the
decision to move to Argentina as well.
This process of allocation can go significantly further. It is
better to apportion the accident costs among subcategories of
drivers on the basis of the accident proneness of the category
rather than to charge the accident costs equally to all drivers. If
driving's share of auto-pedestrian accidents is paid by a set tax
on driver's licenses, some desired deterrence on driving would be
achieved. This allocation of costs, however, fails to distinguish
between driving old cars and new cars, and the best way of reduc-
ing accidents (the cheapest way in terms of the choice for acci-
dents) might be to reduce driving somewhat but to shift most
driving to newer cars.
I shall not discuss now how far we can go in subdividing activ-
ities in allocating accident costs. Suffice it to say that there comes
a point where the cost of further subclassification is greater than
the worth of the choice offered, and that in practice it is possible
to find that point. Indeed, in the context of subclassification for
fault proneness, insurance companies make exactly such a deci-
sion every day when they charge higher rates for unmarried male
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drivers under twenty-five but do not break this down into unmar-
ried male drivers of twenty-two and seven months as against
unmarried .male drivers of twenty-two and eight months.
The point is simply this: were there no costs involved in sub-
classifying activities, it would always be best to put the accident
cost of an activity on its smallest subcategory. To the extent that
the subcategory has the same accident proneness as another sub-
category, no choice between these subcategories would be af-
fected nor would one be desired. To the extent that subcategories
were differently accident prone, some movement to the safer ones
would result because the greater real cost of the more dangerous
one would be reflected in its price. In either case, the activity of
which both were subcategories would automatically also reflect
its own accident proneness relative to other safer activities. In-
stead, if the costs were allocated solely to the larger category or
activity, any possible "general deterrence" at the "subactivity"
level would be lost.
Thus, although it is unclear whether an accident cost is attrib-
utable to driving or walking, in terms of general accident deter-
rence it is better to allocate it to one or the other or both than to
pay it out of general taxes.32 And to the extent that the cost is
put on these activities, further subclassification by drivers, type
of cars, and the lke, causing people to shift from the more acci-
dent-prone subclassification to the safer one, will bring about
minimization of accident costs.
In this sense, then, the problem of "what is a cost of what" is
further diminished. For even in a nonbargaining situation where
accident costs are not readily divisible between the activities in-
volved, it is clear that placing the costs on them is better than
externalizing the costs.
C. Where Certain Comparisons Are More
Important Than Others
The lack of a simple theory for apportioning costs is no ob-
stacle in a bargaining situation where the parties are able to work
out the proper allocation of burdens. Nor is it a bar when there
is no hope of influencing one of the activities involved in an acci-
-2 If subclassification is in fact -too expensive, then social insurance paid out of
general taxes is the best solution; for, as we have indicated before, social insurance
places the cost on the category - living in a given country - of which all other
classifications are subcategories. It seems unlikely, however, in view of insurance
company actuarial practices, that no subclassification would be worthwhile.
IVol. 78:713
HeinOnline -- 78 Harv. L. Rev.  734 1964-1965
NONFAULT ACCIDENT-COST ALLOCATION
dent. Thus, if it is clear that pedestrianism is ineluctably here
and nothing much can be done about it or its habits, and our
concern is whether it is better to have driving or busing or how
much of each and what kind of each, then it is proper to consider
as part of the costs of cars and buses the added accidents they
each bring to a pedestrian's world.
3 3
The same would be true if placing part of the cost on pedes-
trians would result, for political, social, or compensation motives,
not in pedestrians bearing this cost at all but in having the cost
removed and externalized both from pedestrians and automobiles,
through state compensation out of general taxes. In that case we
might just as well let cars pay for all joint car-pedestrian accident
costs, as the social insurance would prevent the placing of costs
on pedestrians from leading to any accident-deterring choices
between pedestrianism and, for example, cycling. This being true,
we might as well get the maximum of potential "general accident
deterrence" between cars and buses by placing full pedestrian-
car accident costs on cars and full pedestrian-bus accident costs
on buses.34
This would also be the case if the pedestrians' share of the
costs was generally not paid out of "walking accidents" insurance,
or its equivalent, but was, because pedestrianism is not an organ-
ized activity like driving, insured against as part of a generalized
"harms-that-can-befall-one" insurance. In that case by actuarial
necessity the cost is externalized from pedestrianism and made a
general cost of living. Here also the placing of part of auto-
pedestrian costs on pedestrians would fail to affect the degree of
33 And this is so whatever the reason why "pedestrianism" is taken as fixed.
For whether pedestrianism is fixed because there are no substitutes for it, or
because we want it fixed for political or other nonmarket reasons, the situation
remains the same. We do not care about comparing its costs with other things and
we may as well get the best comparison possible between cars and planes. We
should be careful, however, about what we mean by "fixed." "Fixed" implies the
absence of possible significant changes in the manner in which an activity is
carried on as well as the absence of realistic substitutes for the activity. Thus, if
pedestrianism could be made significantly safer by having pedestrians carry a widget
(a costly safety device), and if putting part or even all of pedestrian-car accident
costs on pedestrians would lead to a cost pressure for widgets, we could by no
means consider pedestrianism as "fixed."
11 If the car driver were uninsured and judgment proof, of course, no general
deterrent effect would be achieved by putting the cost on driving. Further,
should such a driver hit a pedestrian who as a result goes on relief, at least part of
the cost of the accident would be externalized from both driving and walking. It
should not be surprising that precisely such situations give rise to demands for
compulsory insurance.
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pedestrianism.35 Therefore, putting the full cost of pedestrian-car
accidents on cars and of pedestrian-bus accidents on buses, for a
more complete comparison, is the-best we could do.
Furthermore, if we are concerned with driving and walking as
compared to television viewing- if the choice is between taking
a stroll or a drive as a form of amusement, as against staying
home and glaring at the TV set as a form of amusement - then
it does not matter how much of the cost of driving and walking
accidents is borne by either so long as together they bear it all.
And finally, when concern centers on the problem of determining
whether activities should be kept apart in order to limit costs, it
would seem best to place the costs on the party who can most
cheaply undertake the task of separation. The assumption under-
lying these propositions is that our society is interested in a lim-
ited number of comparisons and treats a wide range of potentially
changeable things as given. While fuller comparisons might be
desirable, the limited ones may w611 be the best that can be done.ao
In addition, the problem is somewhat mitigated by the the-
oretical possibility of what I have called artificial bargaining.
Thus, suppose that the costs of vehicle-pedestrian accidents are
placed entirely on cars and buses because concern was focused on
adjusting cars relative to buses and types of cars relative to each
other. Assume also that the concern was misplaced, that we
should have been concerned with pedestrians as against cyclists
or transferring pedestrians to other areas, because those would
have been cheaper ways to avoid these accidents.- This mistake,
if sufficiently gross, might be corrected by artificial bargaining.
Drivers, or auto makers worried about the high cost of using
their products, might find it worthwhile to build pedestrian malls
1 If pedestrians were perfectly aware of the risks involved in walking and
carried no general accident insurance, then putting part of the cost of car-pedestrian
accidents on them would be as effective as if "walking-accident" insurance actually
existed. For then, the risk awareness would accomplish the same function as
the "walking-accident" insurance premium would. But such an assumption is as
unrealistic as the assumption discussed earlier, see pp. 727-28 supra, that industrial
workers were individually as aware of the risks of industrial accidents before
workmen's compensation was developed as their employers were after it was
instituted. Indeed, those few pedestrians who might be aware of the risk would
probably be those who are so conscious of all accident risks that they would carry
general accident insurance. For them, however, as we have just seen, the cost
would be made a general cost of living and not affect walking at all.
"Often the search for such limited comparisons results in putting the full costs
on the newer of the activities that combine to cause the costs, and only shifting
things around if, despite bearing these costs, the new activity gains some dominance.
See, e.g., Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. i Ex. 265 (1866), af'd, L.R. 3 H1. 330 (1868).
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away from busy streets or to bribe walkers to take up cycling.
Although artificial bargaining has its limitations both in cost and
feasibility, it may help to mitigate errors that are sufficiently
egregious. Attempting to decide what comparisons are most im-
portant, together with the safety valve of artificial bargaining to
cure the worst mistakes, may be quite good enough 37 or at least
better than any alternative method of allocating costs.
And this is a very important point, because ultimately such costs
will be allocated for better or worse, and someone will have to
bear their burden. Allocation based on an inexact but rational
guess as to what is an important comparison is likely to be more
helpful in leading to a sensible choice "for or against accidents"
than an allocation based on specifically irrelevant factors like
fault or social insurance, which remove costs from the arena of
most relevant comparisons.
D. Where All Comparisons Seem Equally Important
We should realize that in a great many situations, the important
comparison will not be readily apparent. Where A and B, a set
of substitute activities, are involved in accidents with C and D,
a set of activities that compete with each other and that do
not compete with A and B, and where, moreover, we are con-
cerned with the relationship within each set, we face the most
difficult problem in allocating costs. The same is true when con-
cern focuses on the comparative worth of substitute activities
that are involved in accidents with each other.
Were all the costs of mailman-dog accidents and mailman-cat
accidents placed on the Post Office Department, an important
element in a choice whether to own a cat or a dog would be re-
moved. The Post Office might still find it worthwhile to bribe
people to trade in dogs for cats, but the costs of striking an artifi-
cial bargain are high. Thus, if the choice between dogs and cats
might be important in reducing the seriousness of postman-animal
mishaps, some part of the postman-dog and postman-cat costs
should be placed on owning dogs and cats. Not all should, though,
as that would prejudice the decision of whether to give mailmen
animal repellents or to deliver mail by car.
The question then is how much to allocate to each activity.
17 This is especially true because when the aim is allocation of resources, too
much exactness is both useless and self-defeating for more reasons than are worth-
while listing. A fair collection of them can be found in Calabresi, supra note i, at
503-05, 507-14 & nn1.7 & 41.
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I would suggest that: (i) unless there is reason to suspect that
the choice of one set - for example, cats and dogs - is more
likely to minimize accident costs than the other set, or (2) unless
it is clear that one of the two is in a much better position to under-
take artificial bargaining to correct an error, or (3) unless other
motives, such as compensation, suggest a division, it does not
make much difference how the costs are divided so long as all
members of the same set bear the same proportion. The best that
can be done is to put a cost pressure on owning dogs as against
cats proportionate to the costs each have in common with mail-
men. Thus, the price of owning dogs or cats will at least show the
relative danger each bears of injuring postmen even if it does not
show the absolute value of that danger.
This leaves the problem of allocating costs in instances where
the activities involved are substantially substitutes, and it is im-
portant to compare them in order to determine the best mix -
dogs against cats. A more significant example might be a com-
parison between large cars and small cars. The cost of having
both may be significantly greater than the cost of either alone,
since, when a large car and a small car collide, the damage is
usually greater than if two small or two large cars had been
involved .
3
In many situations where having two activities results in
greater costs than having either one alone, it is simply not worth-
while working out an allocation of these costs other than by a
simple division. This will be clearly true if having both activities
does not add a great deal to the cost of having either alone. It will
also be true if the diversity involved in having both activities
seems to be significantly desired by society collectively, regardless
of how much particular individuals wish to have the diversity.39
Only when these two conditions are absent and in addition the
activities are close substitutes will it be realistic to think that
the degree of diversity will be affected by placing the added cost
of having both activities on one or the other of them.
3 N.Y. Times, June 2, r964, p. 39, col. 2. Compare id., June 3, 1964, p. 45,
col. i, with id., June 5, i964, p. 30, col. 5.
" Thus, a foolish society may feel there is special merit in having both large
and small cars. The variety might seem to be a symbol of wealth which the society
wished perpetuated. If this symbolic value were insufficiently appreciated by
individual buyers, such a society might not want the added costs of diversity to be
placed totally on either large or small cars. For that allocation might result in one
type of car becoming dominant. In the extreme case, the foolish society might even
remove all diversity costs from both. Of course, wiser reasons for collectively
desiring certain diversity costs are not hard to think of.
EVDl. 78:713
HeinOnline -- 78 Harv. L. Rev.  738 1964-1965
NONFAULT ACCIDENT-COST ALLOCATION
Some analytical tools can be brought to bear on this perhaps
not overly significant aspect of the problem, but for the most
part they are somewhat impracticable. First, when one of the
activities can be thought of as being added to a "preexisting sit-
uation" it might be proper to allocate the entire diversity cost -
the difference between the cost of the accidents involving A-B and
the estimated cost if A-A had been involved - to the new activity.
Thus, if we lived in a world of large cars, small cars would only
be worthwhile if their drivers were able to meet the costs they
would add. This would be true even if total costs would be lower
in an all small-car world than in an all large-car world if the cost
of changing entirely to small cars is greater than the savings such
a change would bring. Second, when neither activity can be
thought of as dominant, then the costs of diversity should be
borne by the activity that is otherwise socially more expensive.
If social costs would be minimized by having only small cars,
then the difference between the costs if only small cars were in-
volved in accidents and the costs when large cars and small cars
are involved should be placed on those drivers who choose the
socially more expensive large cars.40
Though the practical problem of knowing which of the sub-
stitutes taken alone would have the lowest social cost cuts deeply
against the usefulness of this type of analysis, to some extent an
ad hoc guess as to which activity would have been more desirable
as an original matter can perhaps be made. When this sort of
guess seems too hard, the best that can be done is to forget about
"diversity costs" and divide accident costs so that a choice be-
tween the competing activities can be based on other costs of each.
E. A Practical Approach to Multilateral
Comparisons - "Involvement"
Despite the lack of any inclusive theoretical basis for appor-
tioning the cost of an accident among the activities involved,
substantial guides to the allocation of costs in a nonfault system
of accident law have been shown to exist in many situations. Yet
a great many cases remain in which there are no rational criteria
4 0 To say that large cars are "socially more expensive" than small cars means
that they would be less desired at the price they would cost if they were the only
kind of car and bore all their accident costs, than would small cars in a similar
situation. Obviously, it is more than difficult to know whether this would be so.
And, indeed, even to suggest it makes one subject to exactly the same comments
made about Professor Coase in note 31 supra.
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for dividing the accident costs among the activities involved. A
straightforward, if rough, solution for these cases is possible.
The cost of each accident might be divided pro rata among the
activities involved and then cumulated for each activity.
For example, if a car and a pedestrian are involved, the cost
will be split between driving and walking. If a car, a pedestrian,
and a cyclist are involved, then the cost will be divided three
ways. If a cost can be allocated between two of the three accord-
ing to any of the previously derived criteria, then this will be
done for two-thirds of the cost and the third activity will bear
the remainder. At the end of any given period of time, those
activities that are involved in more accidents or in more expensive
accidents will bear the greater proportion of all costs. According
to theory, safer but formerly more expensive substitutes will re-
place more dangerbus activities as these are made to bear their
costs.41 Even if categories are initially defined in terms of factors
that are not related to accident proneness, this defect will even-
tually work itself out of the system.
Thus, if everyone drove blue cars and cars were involved in all
accidents, then driving would bear a large part of all accident
costs. Walking, cycling, and the like would bear the rest. If
somehow "blueness" were thought significant, a shift from blue
to red cars would occur; but since it would not help to reduce
41 "Involvement," however, since it divides the costs, is not as good as alloca-
tion to one of the parties on the basis of the factors previously discussed - if
such allocation can be made. Assume, for example, that an accident involving two
activities costs $8o each time it occurs; assume also that such an accident could
always be avoided by either activity through the installation of a safety device
costing $6o per accident prevented. An involvement test would charge each of the
parties $4o. At first glance neither activity would install the safety device. Either
might do so, subsequently, as a result of "artificial bargaining." But if the cost of
entering into an "artificial bargain" was more than $2o, no such bargain could be
struck and the accident would not be avoided even though if either party were
originally charged with the full cost of the accident, the safety device would
readily be installed, as it should be. Lest this horrible situation seem worse than
it is, the exactly opposite conclusion would be reached if instead of the situation
posited, we posit the case where the only way to avoid the accident is if both
activities modify their behavior somewhat, for instance by each installing a $30
safety device.
Leaving aside these extremes, the examples suggest that there are situations
where, on the whole, having one bearer of the whole loss is desirable. Usually these
will be cases where, on the basis of the factors discussed before, we will deem one
of the parties the best loss bearer. There will also be many cases where no such
assessment can be made, but these will usually be cases where some accident-reduc-
ing action on the part of all the activities involved seems desirable. And in these
cases the kind of division *hat involvement makes is probably the best available.
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accident costs, the mistake would not persist. If a shift from big
cars to small cars would reduce costs. then such a shift would be
forthcoming to the extent that the cost differential between small
cars and large cars was magnified by the previous year's cost
allocation.
This method allows for special treatment in cases where the
more exact criteria for allocating costs exist, while dealing with
all other situations in terms of the preponderance of involve-
ments. Its basis is the assumption that although criteria for al-
locating costs cannot always be found, criteria for determining
involvement can. Again, it is necessary to warn that activities
are not treated as "involved" in order to round out metaphysical
notions of causation, but rather to make comparisons between
potential substitutes more meaningful. It does not further this
purpose to treat each sine qua non cause as involved in an acci-
dent. For while in most accidents there will be among the sine
qua non causes some activities that may profitably be compared
with substitute activities, there will also be other such sine qua
non causes not worth comparing. This may be because: (i) there
are virtually no substitutes with less accident-causing potential;
(2) the activity and its substitutes will appear so infrequently in
such accidents that any cost allocation to them could have no
significant effect on choice; or (3) placing the cost on them ini-
tially would result in having the cost removed and externalized
from all the causes.42
Determining which causes are to be excluded as coincidental
will not always be a simple proposition. For example, suppose
a car and a pedestrian collide, and the driver notes that he was
distracted by a low-flying plane. In the normal course of things,
planes will not be a sufficiently significant cause of car-pedestrian
accidents to be worth bothering about. If, however, a fair num-
ber of accidents were to occur near airports, and enough of them
involved distraction by a plane, then it might be worthwhile
considering planes as involved. In that case, the accumulation of
these costs and other costs caused in part by airport noise might
42This elimination of unimportant sine qua non causes is really no more than
a somewhat generalized application of the criteria derived in our earlier discussion
of "Where Certain Comparisons Are More Important Than Others," pp. 734-37
supra, to a multilateral situation. In our earlier discussion we used the criteria to
identify the best cost bearer in an accident involving several potential joint causes.
Here we use them for the easier task of excluding some potentially involved activi-
ties and leaving all those about which we feel sufficiently doubtful so that an
"involvement" type of division seems desirable.
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induce installation of noise-diminishing devices or relocation of
airports. The point is that often it will not be enough to look at
the immediate case, but instead it will be necessary to discover
whether an apparent coincidental cause is similarly involved in
other types of accidents.
In other words, "involvement" is a term of art designed to
include all those factors that are part of an accident and that may
be replaced by substitutes with a substantially different accident
potential.13 It includes those factors that are "typical" of an
accident while ruling out those that are "incidental." Although
the example shows that typicalness and incidentality are not alto-
gether easy notions, they are probably workable."
V. CONCLUSION
Where, then, does all this bring us? It should be clear that in
this analysis, I have made no attempt to set up a "system" for
dealing with accident costs in any or all given areas. I have made
no attempt even in the automobile-pedestrian area to specify
whether accident costs ought to be divided between pedestrians
and cars or put solely on one party, and if they ought to be di-
vided, whether the best way is by excluding certain damage items
from allowable recovery or by a computation of all damages
followed by a division. I have not done these things because
such specific policy decisions depend only in part on the analysis
of the "general deterrence" factor that I have centered on. In
addition, even if they were solely dependent on that factor,
quite a lot of empirical information on the administrative ex-
pense of various systems, as well as on the importance of various
"comparisons," would be essential.
What I have tried to do is clarify one part of the theoretical
basis for such practical judgments. In doing this, I have sug-
gested that usually in our society, decisions on how much we
want to deter accidents are made in a way that combines market
"' I do not mean that such decisions should be made on a case-by-case basis.
That question is entirely a matter of the costs involved. There might be some con-
texts in which a case-by-case determination of what activities are involved and
what are not may he worth the extreme cost of'such determinations. In other
areas guidelines of general applicability as to involvement might do nearly as good
a job of excluding irrelevant activities and the fact that they do it much more
cheaply than the case-by-case approach would be conclusive.
"4The words "typical" and "incidental" in themselves are meaningless; they
are only meant to be suggestive of the discussion that preceded them.
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choice and collective political judgments. My feeling is that this
choice can be made more effectively through a system of accident
liability based on accident "involvement" instead of fault, com-
bined with a system of criminal and semicriminal penalties for
specific behavior, and overseen by collective political judgments
on the desirability or undesirability of certain activities regard-
less of the market.
When we are dealing with deterrence of activities that have
some social usefulness but that cause accidents, the first step
toward deciding how much of these activities is wanted can still,
in a substantially free enterprise society, be best determined by
the market. There are simply too many such decisions to be
made collectively in any intelligent fashion. However, in a wide
and perhaps growing area, we are dissatisfied with letting a purely
market determination of social usefulness rule. This is because
of the inherent inexactness of both the market mechanism and
of any estimate of accident costs and to whom they belong. It
is also because in a growing area we are becoming convinced,
whether rightly or wrongly, that individuals do not know what
is best for themselves. 5 For both these reasons, some degree of
subsidization or deterrence of activities based on collective deci-
sions overruling the market is inevitable and probably desirable.
Such decisions -like that to subsidize drivers over seventy, or
to bar drunken driving- are, however, best made openly and in
the face of the market decision, so that it is clear to us when
we make such decisions that what we are really saying is, "In
this case considerations other than individual choice among alter-
natives are paramount and supersede individual choice."
I do not, with all this emphasis on "general deterrence" of
accident-causing activities, foreclose the specific deterrence that,
it is often asserted, fault liability brings about. I simply believe
that the best way to bar groups of acts that we feel politically are
sufficiently bad that they should be barred regardless of their
market usefulness is not through a "fault" system connected
"The importance of this trend can easily be exaggerated by looking at those
areas of the economy where advertising plays its most significant role. There it is
easy, though certainly not always correct, to assume that the choices made by
individuals are irrational and, more important, that the individuals will all too soon
regret having made them. But the area of final consumer choices, even if it were
as irrational as we sometimes think, is only a small part of the picture. If we
consider all the decisions at the production level which are made by individuals
operating through the market mechanism, it is much easier to conclude that in-
dividual choosers can still do better for themselves than anyone else.
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with insurance devices that remove most of the desired specific
deterrence. Instead, the way to effect such a political judgment is
through criminal or semicriminal penalties.
In elaborating such a "general deterrence" approach I have
spent a great deal of time on the very difficult problems of what
the costs of accidents are and to whom they belong. I have done
this from the point of view of general deterrence and not at all
from the point of view of compensation. This is simply for clarity
and not because I would slight compensation as a goal of accident
law. I will readily admit, however, that if compensation were
the only goal, then by far the most effective and efficient method
of accomplishing it would be through a system of general social
insurance, which would externalize the costs of accidents from
any market decisions.
Social insurance, however, is not likely to be the solution if
we are interested in the "savings" brought about by general de-
terrence, as well as the savings bought about by compensation.
In fact, if it can be shown that a system is available that com-
bines a substantial amount of general deterrence with an adequate
degree of compensation, that system may be far better than either
social insurance or an optimal general deterrence scheme.
The result is that we may very well be influenced in the divi-
sion of accident costs, between autos and pedestrians say, by
compensation motives. If we are in doubt about the proper divi-
sion of costs, or which are the important comparisons from a
general deterrence standpoint, it may well be proper to make the
division in a way that accomplishes compensation (risk spreading)
best. For in such a case little general deterrence savings would
be lost through such a move, and substantial compensation savings
gained.
Indeed, it would be the height of foolishness to establish a sys-
tem - even a perfect system - for market general deterrence
if this system were so unpalatable on compensation grounds that
it would soon be replaced by social insurance in order to accom-
plish compensation. And this, of course, is another problem with
fault liability. For even if it accomplished general deterrence as
well and as cheaply as an "involvement" system (which I believe
it does not), it is - apparently - so undesirable from a com-
pensation point of view that it is constantly under attack.
This attack leads too often to the simple alternative of social
insurance. Such a result would eliminate even the attenuated
general deterrence th2 t the fault system accomplishes, and there-
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fore would substalitially decrease the range of informed indi-
vidual market choices with respect to activities and accidents in
our society. In other words, if we stick too obstinately to a sys-
tem that gives us some but not very effective general deterrence
but very poor compensation, we may find that we end up with
a system that gives us no general deterrence, or market choice
on accidents, in exchange for a perfection in compensation we
may neither want nor need. This would be so despite the fact
that a little work can develop a modified enterprise liability ap-
proach that would give us better general deterrence than fault
and as much compensation as we want.
Ultimately, of course, the problem of what we will do in this
area reflects a much broader problem. For here, as so often, we
are faced with the fact that a time-honored system (fault) fails
to satisfy a modern demand (compensation). We can react to
this by dividing into hostile "conservative" and "radical" camps
with the result that either nothing gets done or we abolish every-
thing about our previous system, and set up one that meets the
demand regardless of its other consequences (social insurance).
Alternatively, we can work to see if there are other ways to retain
what we believe is fundamental in the old, and yet adequately
meet the demands it failed to satisfy. I believe that somewhere in
a nonfault enterprise-liability approach, combined with tort or
criminal fines for some specific acts, such a satisfactory middle
ground exists. I also believe that the finding of such middle
ground is the mark of a legal-political system that works.
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